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SHOPLIFTING LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL
RAMIFICATIONS OF MERCTAINT
DETENTION STATUTES
Private police in the United States outnumber public police two
to one.' Although they have substantially the same responsibilities as
public law enforcement authorities, most private police are subject
to tort liability which the public police are able to avoid. 2 However,
there have been developments in the law that give retail merchants'
police the same insulation from tort liability that public police enjoy
without subjecting the former to the constitutional restraints upon
the latter. The purpose of this comment is to explore this anomaly in
the law and to offer a solution that will enable retail police to perform their necessary duties without creating a special "super-police"
status.
I.

THE ScoPE OF THE PROBLEM

"Security" has become an essential part of large-scale retail merchandising operations.3 Losses arising from shoplifting and internal
"inventory shrinkage" increased last year to a record $3.5 billion,4
and arrests soared to a record 267,000.1 The responsibility for surveillance and investigation of any criminal activity which occurs on
the store premises rests squarely on the shoulders of the merchants'
security forces. 6
The merchants' uniformed and "plain clothes" detectives are frequently armed, and they use highly sophisticated equipment 7 in their
criminal investigations. For the most part, they are thoroughly familiar with police methods of apprehension, search, interrogation and
arrest.8 Often the security detective or officer is a retired policeman or
has extensive training in police methods.
1. Scott and McPherson, The Development of the Private Sector of the Criminal
Justice System, 6 LAw & Soc. Rav. 267, 268 (1971).
2. See Comment, Private Police Forces: Legal Powers and Limitations, 38 U. CHI.
L. Rav. 555, 564. See generally Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual
Rights, 39 INN.L. REv. 493 (1955).
3. See generally S. CURTIS, SEcURaTY: ExTERNAL THaxT (1971); S. CuRTIS, MODERN
RErAuL SEcuRmIY (1960).

4. Based on 1971 data from National Retail Merchants Association as reported in
the Long Island Press, Nov. 20, 1972, at 8, col. 5.
5. 1971 UNIF Rm CRIM REPORTS 113.

6. Interview with the director of a combined stores protection agency, Oct. 5, 1972
at New York, N.Y. (name withheld by request).

7. Curtis, Security: A Challenge to Shoplifters, Putmasmsa

WEuLy, Sept. 1, 1969,

at 40-2.
8. Hellerman, One in Ten Shoppers is a Shoplifter, Naw Yore Tirms MAGAZINE,
Mar. 15, 1970, at 34.
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A shoplifting 9 investigation begins with the "suspicion" or actual
observation of an attempted theft. Suspicion may be aroused in many
ways.' 0 A customer carrying an open shopping bag, holding a brief
case, or wearing an oversized overcoat may arouse the suspicion of a
store detective or sales clerk. "Suspicion" is often triggered by such
subjective factors as the general appearance and mannerisms of the
suspect, or by the personal prejudices of the security officer." A close,
intensive observation of the suspect follows.
If suspicion grows into "reasonable grounds"' 2 to believe a theft
is taking place, the detective then approaches the suspect as the latter
leaves the establishment. The detective usually questions the suspect
about the contents of shopping bags, pockets or handbags. The suspect is asked to accompany the detective to an interrogation room,
ostensibly to "clear up the matter." Here search, 18 interrogation, mugshots 4 and fingerprinting 15 take place.
The suspect is "required" to sign a release of liability if investigation reveals innocence, or a confession and release form if investiga9. Shoplifting has been defined as the "theft of goods displayed for sale." State v.
Boyd, 5 Conn. Cir. 648, 654, 260 A.2d 618, 622 (App. Div. 1969). The essential elements
of the offense are the willful appropriation of merchandise combined with intent to
convert the merchandise to one's own use without paying for it. Yearwood v. State,
455 S.W.2d 612, 617 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970). For an excellent discussion of the shoplifting problem see Comment, The Merchant, the Shoplifter and the Law, 55 MINN.
L. RLv. 825 (1971).
Retail security police also apprehend persons suspected of possession of counterfeit
money, Wolin v. Abraham & Strauss, 64 Misc.2d 982, 316 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1970), and stolen credit cards, United States v. Bolden, 461 F.2d 998 (8th Cir.

1972) (per curiam).
10. S. CuRans, MoDnN RErAuL SEcUaR
870 (1960).
11. Id. at 870-71. In Tota v. Alexander's, 63 Misc. 2d 908, 909, 314 N.Y.S.2d 93, 94,
aff'd mem., 38 App. Div. 2d 892, 330 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1st Dept. 1972), the detective became
suspicious because Ms. Tota was wearing a "bizarre colored outfit." But see Browning
v. Pay-Less Self Service Shoes, Inc., 373 S.W.2d 71, 75 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). The
question is academic, of course, if the suspect is guilty.
12. Most shoplifter detention statutes, discussed infra Section III, used the words
"reasonable grounds" to believe that a theft is taking place. Reasonable grounds and
probable cause have been held to be virtually equivalent, with an objective (whether a
reasonable man could suspect that a theft is taking place) being applied. Coblyn v.
Kennedy's, Inc., Mass...,
__
268 N.E.2d 860, 862 (1971); cf. People v. Morfield, 41
Misc. 2d 935, 936, 246 N.Y.S.2d 451, 452 (Crim. Ct. Bronx Co. 1964).
13. In People v. Santiago, 53 Misc. 2d 264, 267, 278 N.Y.S.2d 260, 263 (Rockland
County Ct. 1967), the Court held that neither consent nor a search warrant is necessary
to conduct such a search. The New York Court of Appeals has further held that
evidence of an unrelated crime is admissible in a criminal proceeding regardless of
the validity of the underlying shoplifting charge. People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378, 239
N.E.2d 625, 292 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1057 (1969). But cf. United
States v. Brown, 294 A.2d 499 (D.C. App. 1972) where suppression of evidence of another
crime was granted because the defendant lacked scienter to commit the underlying
offense-failure to pay a cab fare.
14. CuaRTis, supra note 10, at 440; interview, supra note 6.
15. Cuans, supra note 10, at 450; interview, supra note 6.
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tion points to guilt.16 Frequently, the suspect is required to set out
the facts in his or her own handwriting. 17 If the evidence suggests
that the suspect possesses unpaid-for merchandise (regardless of intent) the merchants' security police are faced with the options of accepting restitution of the goods and releasing the party, or of turning
him or her over to the police for prosecution. 8 Invariably, if the cost
of the merchandise exceeds the store's "no prosecution limit," a formal arrest ensues. 19
The courts have held that, absent special patrolman status, 20 merchant security detectives are private persons, 2 ' despite the fact that
their demeanor and activities are similar to those of the "official" police. Since constitutional safeguards do not extend to the actions of
private citizens,2 2 store detectives are under no duty to respect the in16. Record on Appeal at 173, Jacques v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 30 N.Y.S.2d 466, 285

N.E.2d 871, 334 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1972). "[I]f a confession is obtained promptly the suspect
should either be released (if a mistake was made) or arrested." W.T. GRANT OPERATION
MANUAL ON SnoP uLm, quoted in Peak v. W.T. Grant Co., 409 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Mo.
1966). The following is a "confession form" obtained from a major department store
chain, with the name of the chain and its location omitted.
Date
Time
I,
(name)
, of
(address)
do hereby, state declare:
1. That on the
day of
_
19_, between
M. and __ .M.
I entered the premises of X DEPT. STORE at CITY, STATE and removed the
following articles without any intention of paying for them:
2. I hereby release and forever discharge said X DEPT. STORE and its
agents from any claims for damages because of this investigation.
3. Permission is hereby granted for X DEPT. STORE to search me, my
premises and my automobile.
4. No promises have been made to me and this statement is made voluntarily,
without threat, force or duress, to make the truth known.
Signed
Witnesses:

17. Record on Appeal at 38, 103, Jacques v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 30 N.Y.2d 466,
285 N.E.2d 871, 334 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1972).
18. Cooke v. J.J. Newberry & Co., 96 N.J. Super. 9, 15, 232 A.2d 425, 428 (App. Div.
1967).
19. Interview, supra note 6.
20. Pratt v. State, 9 Md. App. 220, 263 A.2d 247 (1970).
21. People v. Randazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65 (2d D. Ct. App. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1000 (1964); People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378, 239 N.E2d 625, 292
N.Y.S.2d 874 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1057 (1969).
22. This result arises from a strong line of cases that holds the government alone
to a standard of care in safeguarding constitutional rights. The United States Supreme
Court in Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) held that the 4th Amendment
protections against unlawful searches and seizures "was not intended to be a limitation
upon other than governmental agencies." If the interest involved is purely private,
then the suspect is not entitled to constitutional protection. If the interest is public,
then the suspect is guaranteed constitutional protection. The question is whether or
not a governmental agency is the conduit through which a person is deprived of his
rights. With respect to merchant police activities, this test is dearly inadequate.
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dividual's constitutional rightsPm This policy is based on the rationale
that a suspect has a remedy in tort.24 It is submitted that the suspect
has no real tort remedy, and that a policy based upon the premise
that such a remedy does exist is inherently defective.
II. TORT LIABILTY
Under common law standards the merchant was strictly liable in
tort for his "honest" mistakes in the apprehension and prosecution of
shoplifters. 25 If the suspect was found to be innocent, he had an action for false imprisonment or false arrest against the merchant. The
California Supreme Court modified this common law doctrine in
1936 by holding that a merchant could, without liability, detain a
suspect for the purpose of investigation of the alleged theft.20 If the
detention was reasonable and based on probable cause, the merchant
was immune from civil liability for false imprisonment.27
Following California's lead, forty-four other states and the District of Columbia have either codified an investigation privilege or
have recognized it by judicial decision. 28 The scope of the tort im23. E.g., People v. Crabtree, 239 Cal.App.2d 789, 49 Cal. Rptr. 285 (2d D. Ct. App.
1966), hearing denied, Mar. 30, 1966 (Cal. Sup. Ct.) (no right to an attorney during
shoplifter interrogation); People v. Randazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d, 768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65
(2d D. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1000 (1964) (evidence illegally obtained by

store detective admissible in criminal prosecution); State v. Bolan, 27 Ohio St. 2d 15,
271 N.E.2d 839 (1971) (Miranda inapplicable to store detectives).
24. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 422 (1971) (Burger, C.J. dissenting).

25. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 654-57, 261 A.2d 731,
738-39 (1970).
26. Collyer v. S.H. Kress Co., 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936).
27. "No question of false arrest is involved in the case.... We are here concerned
only with the right of the defendant store to detain the plaintiff for purpose of investigation: .. ." Id. at 179-80, 54 P.2d at 23. But see King v. Andersen, 242 Cal. App. 2d
606, 609, 51 Cal. Rptr. 561,563 (3d D. Ct. App. 1966). RSTATE MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 120A at 202-03 (1965) recognizes the privilege to detain but states that there is
liability if an actual arrest is made. Accord, PRossER, LAW OF Toms, § 22 at 122 (4th
ed. 1971).
28. See appendix. Michigan's statute does not provide an absolute defense but
merely mitigates damages. In Arkansas, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota the suspect
apparently must have the goods in his possession in order for the merchant to invoke
the statutory privilege. Montana and Nevada statutes allow the merchant to "request"
a suspect to remain. Rhode Island only grants a detention power to police. Vermont
only permits a merchant to request patrons to keep merchandise in full view. These
statutes have been attacked on constitutional grounds. Note, 25 LA. L. Rav. 956, 963
(1965). Courts have been reluctant to reach these important questions. See, e.g., Wilde
v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 160 So. 2d 839 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
One or two states have already repealed their antishoplifting legislation. They
found it was being abused by merchants at the cost of innocent citizens ...
It is the contention of many retail security men that if a store operated its retail
security properly this type of special legislation would not be needed.
Cuans, supra note 10, at 144.
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munity ranges from investigation of ownership of the goods, through
detention, interrogation, search and seizure, to actual arrest. The
statutes protect only merchants and their agents; other "private po29
lice" are not protected.
Under the umbrella of "reasonable grounds" some outlandish
practices have been developed and condoned. In a civil suit 0 following the dismissal of a criminal action, Ms. Freeman, a 63 year old
plaintiff, testified that she went to Montgomery Ward with her
daughter and her young grandchild to exchange some zippers which
she had purchased previously. The salesclerk informed her that an
exchange could not be made without a salescheck. When Ms. Freeman then purchased another zipper, the salesclerk became suspicious.
The clerk testified that, "It was strange for a customer to purchase
something she did not want." She thought Ms. Freeman had taken
some extra zippers, and she notified the management. The store manager met Ms. Freeman at the exit door, pushed her face against the
glass, and asked her if she had taken some zippers. The plaintiff then
returned "voluntarily" to the store office and was catapulted into a
chair. Police were called and Ms. Freeman was taken to the station
house, where she was fingerprinted and "booked." She was subsequently acquitted of the shoplifting charge in police court."1
Ms. Freeman won damages of $12,000. The judgment of the district court was reversed on appeal and a new trial ordered. The
Fourth Circuit held that, under Virginia law,32 there could be no recovery if the defendant merchant has reasonable grounds to believe
that the plaintiff customer was committing larceny and if the defendant's conduct was reasonable.3m
Although the Fourth Circuit never reached the issue of which
party bears the burden of proof of reasonableness, at least one other
jurisdiction has placed it on the plaintiff, 84 and others apparently do,
sub silentio. The effect of this placement is to hold the merchant to a
standard of care in his detention and arrest procedures that few plain29. Washington County Kennel Club, Inc. v. Edge, 216 So. 2d 512 (Fla. App. 1968),
cert. dismissed, 225 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1969).
30. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Freeman, 199 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1952).
31. Id. at 722.
32. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Wickline, 188 Va. 485, 489, 50 S.E.2d 387, 388
(1948). But see Zayre of Virginia, Inc. v. Gowdy, 207 Va. 47, 147 SYE2d 710 (1966) (under

statute).
33. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Freeman, 199 F.2d 720, 724 (4th Cir. 1952).
34. Cooke v. JJ. Newberry & Co., 96 N.J. Super. 9, 16, 232 A.2d 425, 429 (App. Div.
1967). Contra, Tota v. Alexander's, 63 Misc. 2d 908, 910, 314 N.Y.S.2d 93, 95, aff'd mem.,
38 App. Div. 2d 892, 330 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Ist Dept. 1972); see Butler v. W.E. Walker
Stores, Inc., 222 So. 2d 128 (Aliss. 1969).
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tiffs could prove unreasonable. Merchants have been known to physically accost,3 5 forcibly search,30 "coerce" confessions,ar and libel and
slander3 8 with nearly complete immunity from tort liability based
upon the reasonableness standard.
III.

THE DETENTION PRIVILEGE

All of the merchant detention statutes permit the retailer to detain a person suspected of shoplifting. 9 Although most of the statutes
do not specifically authorize an arrest,4 0 more often than not the detention culminates in one.41 It is one thing to question a person on
the suspicion that a crime has been committed and quite another to
arrest a suspect for a crime known to have been committed. 42 The
statutes, therefore, require an extremely broad construction to include the arrest privilege.
The Second Circuit, in the case of United States v. Vita,48 distinguished arrest from detention on the ground that the detainee in a
detention situation has the ability to exculpate himself from the alleged criminal act, 4
Detention for a short and reasonable period in order to question is not an arrest.... [T]he line between detention and arrest is a thin one but a necessary one if there is to be any effective enforcement of the criminal law. For it not only aids the
police but also protects those who are readily able to exculpate
themselves from being arrested and having charges preferred
against them before their explanations are considered. 45
Following this reasoning, the New York Court of Appeals has held
35. Weyandt v. Mason's Stores, Inc, 279 F. Supp. 283 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
86. People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378, 239 N.E.2d 625, 292 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1057 (1969).

37.
38,
39.
40.

See
J.S.
See
An

Hellerman, supra note 8.
Dillon &Sons Stores, Co. v. Carrington, 169 Colo. 242, 455 P.2d 201 (1969).
appendix.
arrest is the taking of an individual into custody in order that he be made

to answer a criminal charge before a court of law. Foote, Safeguards in the Law of
Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 16, 37 (1957).

41. Thus, it was noted that the New Jersey statute specifically authorizes an arrest.
Cooke v. J.J. Newberry & Co., 96 N.J. Super. 9, 15, 232 A.2d 425, 427-28 (App. Div. 1967).

It is also in the detectives' interest to have the suspect arrested since many stores
pay a bonus for exceeding a fixed arrest quota. Bonkowski v. Arlan's Department Store,
383 Mich. 90, 90-100, 174 N.W.2d 765, 768 (1970).
42. PRoSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 11, at 46 (4th ed. 1971).
43. 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 823 (1962).
44. Id. at 530.
45. People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 244, 219 N..2d 595, 598-99, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217,
222 (1966), aff'd sub nom. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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that the evidence on which detention is based need not be of the same
"degree or conclusiveness" as that required to effect an arrest.46
Thus, until recently, New York adhered to the Second Circuit's
arrest-detention distinction. But, in Jacquesv. Sears Roebuck & Co.,47
the Court of Appeals appears to have abandoned the distinction. The
plaintiff, a three-fingered carpenter, had paid $30.00 for several items
of merchandise, but failed to pay $1.90 for ten reflectorized letters. A
Sears store detective spotted the "crime" taking place and arrested
Jacques at his car. After searching the suspect and inducing him to
sign a confession and release the store detective had Jacques booked
for petit larceny by the Syracuse police. The criminal charge was dismissed for lack of proof of intent.
Jacques then instituted a civil suit against Sears which was subsequently dismissed. On appeal, he argued that because detention is not
synonymous with arrest Sears was liable for false arrest, although immune from liability for the detention. The Court of Appeals disagreed, determining that the legislature had created immunity both
for detention and for arrest. However, the court also indicated that
the terms "detention" and "arrest" are interchangeable, except where
"the [statutory] language appears to restrict detention to a limited
restraint."48 (emphasis added)
The general rule is that a private arrest is invalid unless the
person arrested has in fact committed the crime for which the
arrest was made. In effect section 218 [the merchant detention
statute] carves out an exception for merchants detaining or arresting shoplifters. 49
Apparently, the Court of Appeals ignored the wording of the
statute, its legislative history, and the court's own prior decisions in
coming to this conclusion. In fact, the statute as construed by the
Court of Appeals raised serious constitutional questions. The statute
specifically limits the "restraint" to detention "for the purpose of investigation or questioning as to the ownership of merchandise."5 0 The
"detention" must be for a reasonable time, defined as "the time necessary to permit the person detained to make a statement, or refuse
46. People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 445, 201 N.E2d 32, 34, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461
(1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965).
47. 30 N.Y.2d 466, 285 N.E2d 871, 334 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1972).
48. Id. at 473-4, 285 N.E.2d at 875, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 639 (1972).
49. Id. at 474, 285 N.E2d at 875, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 639 (1972). Four years earlier the
court held that the anti-shoplifting statutes did not validate the arrest. People v.
Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378, 380, 239 NXE2d 625, 627, 292 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876 (1968), cert.
denied, 893 U.S. 1057 (1969).
50. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 217-18 (McKinney 1968).
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to make a statement and the time necessary to examine ...
cords ... relative to the ownership of the merchandise."5 1

the re-

Clearly, the "reasonable time," and therefore the immunity, had
passed after Jacques signed the confession and release, since the investigation was over at the time. At that point the statute was no
longer in effect.5 2 The validity of Jacques' arrest should therefore
have been measured by the standards applicable under the New York
53
State citizens arrest statute.

For an arrest to be valid under the citizens arrest statute it must
be for a crime actually committed. 4 Although Jacques was found innocent of the shoplifting charge, and therefore the arrest was invalid,
the Court of Appeals denied him relief. An ordinary private citizen
would have been liable in tort, but Sears, the merchant, was not, and
for Henry Jacques there was no remedy.
The legislative history supports the proposition that the merchant
detention statute does not encompass an arrest made by the merchants' private policemen. The Governor's Memoranda approving
General Business Law §§ 217-218 states:
this bill will provide a defense in certain actions based upon a
detention.., it is to be noted that this bill does not authorize
a merchant or peace officer to take any action against a suspected thief which would not be justified under our present
laws relating to arrest. 5 (emphasis added)
Both the legislative history of the statute and prior decisions dealing with the distinctions between detention and arrest recognize that
the standard of "reasonableness" for arrest is applicable only to public law enforcement agencies, 6 and that private citizens acting in that
capacity should be held to a higher standard, defined as "guilt of the
accused. '57 The police are subject to constitutional sanctions against
51. Id.
52. See Roker v. Gertz, Long Island, 34 App. Div. 2d 680, 310 N.Y.S.2d 536 (2d
Dept. 1970). Comment, THE MERCHANT, = SHOPLIFTER AND THE LAW, 55 MINN. L.
REv. 825, 854, 860 (1971).
53. L. 1881, c. 642, as amended N.Y. Crim. Pro. Law § 140.30(l) (McKinney 1971).

Comment, supra, note 52 at 860.
54. McLoughlin v. New York Edison Co., 252 N.Y. 202, 169 N.E. 277 (1929).
55. 1960 Nmv YoRK LECsSLATrvE ANNUAL 568. Also see Assemblyman Campbell's
memorandum, id. at 146: "Non-compliance [with the comprehensive and explicit language of this bill] renders the merchant or employer liable to such legal action without
the help of the defense which this bill provides."
56. See People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 245, 219 N.E.2d 595, 599, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217,
222-23 (1966), aff'd sub nom. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
57. McLoughlin v. New York Edison Co., 252 N.Y. 202, 169 N.E. 277 (1929); Note,
The Law of Citizens' Arrest, 65 COLUm. L. REv. 502 (1965).
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abuse of power.58 The private citizen is checked from abuse of privilege by liability in tort. The result of the Jacques case is that in New
York, a leading jurisdiction, the innocent citizen is without any remedy for an illegal arrest made by a store security officer or detective.
Thus, there are some "private" police who enjoy "public" police privileges without the attendant public responsibilities.
IV.

THE SEARCH PRIVILEGE

The merchants' immunity from liability and their arrest privileges are augmented by the failure of the courts to apply any exclusionary rule to evidence or confessions obtained during the course of
a "detention" by private persons. 59
An exclusionary rule is, at best, a secondary remedy. Its purpose
is to deter--"to compel respect for the constitutional guarantee in
the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."0o It is precisely because all police tend to mold their investigatory practices to constitutional standards in order to secure
convictions that courts have invoked constitutional restraints on police conduct. 61
Private police, like public police, have a genuine interest in obtaining convictions.6 2 Their investigations also focus on the general
public. Although the merchants' primary interest is in recovering
stolen goods, they, too, have a strong interest in seeking criminal sanctions. The merchants would like to see the professional shoplifter incarcerated. He would like to deter thrill seekers and teenagers from
the temptation of shoplifting. In those few states without a detention
statute or judicial recognition of the privilege, the merchant, by securing a conviction, will insulate himself from tort liability.
In the case of store detectives, the courts have consistently held
that exclusionary rules do not apply. This has led to particularly appalling practices. For example, in People v. Randazzo 8 Victoria
Randazzo selected several articles of clothing from the racks of a Los
58. Via the exclusionary rule. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
59. See generally Comment, Seizures by Private Parties:Exclusion in Criminal Cases,
19 STAN. L. REv. 608 (1967); Note, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 232 (1964).
60. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1964).
61. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
62. Comment, Seizure by Private Parties: Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19 STAN. L.
Rnv. 608, 615 (1967).
63. 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65 (2d D. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 1000 (1964). Accord, People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378, 239 N.E.2d 625, 292 N.Y.S.2d
874, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1057 (1969) (evidence of a gun admissible although shoplifting
charge dismissed). But cf. People v. McGrew, I Cal. 3d 404, 462 P.2d 1, 82 Cal. Rptr.
473 (1969); United States v. Brown, 294 A.2d 499 (D.C. App. 1972).
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Angeles department store. She carried them into a dressing room.
The room was closed on three sides by partitions and on the fourth
side by a curtain. While the defendant was in the dressing room, a
store detective entered an adjacent dressing room, assumed a prone
position, and, looking beneath the partition between the two dressing rooms, observed the defendant trying on clothes. As the detective
watched, the defendant placed an article of clothing in her handbag.
She was arrested by the merchant's security police while leaving the
building.
At the defendant's criminal trial the "observant" detective was
permitted to testify.6 She stated that this method of observation had
been frequently used in the past despite the fact that the store detectives had no objective reason to suspect that the customer intended
to shoplift. The detective testified that many convictions had been
obtained, prior to this case, on evidence discovered in the same manner. The District Court of Appeal held that such evidence was ad-

missible since the detective was a private person and private persons
are not required to respect the constitutional rights of others. 5
The rationale for not invoking the exclusionary rule in private
search and seizure cases has been the availability of the tort remedy.
However, as already indicated, this remedy is illusory in shoplifting
cases. 66
The ramifications of the court's holding are frightening. A per-

son may be the victim of an illegal search and never know it. Very
sophisticated surveillance and search equipment that can count the

change in a person's pocket, photograph him, and scan him for chemical detectors on merchandise tags that positively identify stolen merchandise is in use today.6 7 If this type of search were made by governmental authorities, the evidence of the search would be inadmissible
in a criminal prosecution.68 Yet the courts claim that the merchant
does not have a sufficient interest in criminal prosecutions to clothe
his actions with the color of state law which would make constitutional restrictions applicable to the merchant's actions.6 9
64. People v. Randazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 776, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65, 71 (2d D. Ct.
App. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1000 (1964).
65. Id.
66. Id. See Note, 87 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 609 (1964) for an excellent discussion of this
matter in light of Randazzo.

67. Curtis, Security: A Challenge to Shoplifters, PunuasHEs WEVXLY, Sept. 1, 1969,
at 40-2.

68. Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962),
Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962).
69. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 422 (1971) (Burger, C. J., dissenting); Note, 12 U.C.L.A. L. Rxv. 232, 238 (1964).
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This rationale is unsupported by the facts. Not only do merchants
have a sufficient interest, but they are responsible for a large number
of arrests and prosecutions each year. 70 The conclusion is obvious;
they are effectively police without police responsibilities.
V.

THE INTERROGATION PRIVILEGE

Not only do courts fail to invoke exclusionary rules in cases where
there has been an illegal search by "private police," they also refuse
to exclude any evidence obtained during the interrogation of a suspect. The merchant is not required to advise the suspect of his constitutional rights. 71 Again the rationale for this is that the merchant is
a private citizen to whom constitutional restraints do not apply and
who "is not trained in police methods, and would not have the faint72
est notion concerning the matter of advising suspects of rights."
This argument has little merit in fact since most store detectives are
retired policemen or go through rigorous training,7" and are thoroughly familiar with the fine points of sophisticated interrogation
techniques. 4
Since Mirandav. Arizona,7 5 at least sixteen jurisdictions have held
Mirandainapplicable to private security guards whose distinct function and purpose is to apprehend shoplifters.7 6 The theme uniting
these cases is that the private security guard is exempt from both the
77
letter and the thrust of Miranda.
A leading case is People v. Frank.7 Anita Frank was an employee
of a department store. She was forcibly detained on mere "suspicion"
and interrogated by six security detectives. During the interrogation,
70. Thirty-nine stores which are members of New York City's Stores Mutual Protection Association reported nearly 10,000 apprehensions in 1959. S. CuaRIS, MoDmn RET-rAiL
SrcuRm 779-82 (1960).
71. E.g., State v. Masters, 261 Iowa 366, 154 N.W.2d 133 (1967); People v. Frank,
52 Misc. 2d 266, 275 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1966); State v. flolan, 27 Ohio St.
2d 15, 271 N.E2d 839 (1971). But see Pratt v. State, 9 Md. App. 220, 263 A.2d 247 (1970)
where Miranda warnings were held to be mandated as the detective was a "special
patrolman" by statute.
72. Hood v. Commonwealth, 448 S.W.2d 388, 391 (Ky. 1969).
73. Interview, supra note 6.
74. Cuans, supra note 10, at 292. Macy's uses a bright yellow room for interrogation
since it makes it difficult for suspect not to confess. Hellerman, supra note 8 at 53.
Accord, ROGERS, DErEcarON AND PREvENTIoN or BusiNEss LossEs 10 (1962).
75. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
76. Comment, Miranda Warnings in other than Police Custodial Interrogations,
21 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 135, 139 (1972).

77. Id.; Note, Admissibility of Confessions or Admissions of Accused Obtained
During Custodial Interrogation by Non-Police Personnel:Are the Miranda Warnings
Required?, 40 MAss. L.J. 139 (1968).
78. 52 Misc. 2d 266, 275 N.YS.2d 570 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1966).
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Ms. Frank made certain inculpatory statements without the benefit
of Mirandawarnings. The defendant contended that those statements
were inadmissible because, under Miranda, no suspect may be permitted to make incriminating statements without being informed of
her rights. The court rejected this contention and held: 7
... the security guards herein were under no duty to warn the
defendant prior to obtaining any statements from her, and
consequently, there is no issue presented warranting a hearing
(concerning the admissibility of the incriminating statements)
under the guidelines found in Mirandav. Arizona.
The tone of the Frank decision indicates a narrow interpretation of
Miranda, an interpretation that fails to acknowledge the far reaching consequences of the police duties of private store detectives.
Six months later the Syracuse City Court decided the case of
People v. Williams.80 This court, on similar facts, "reluctantly" fol8
lowed the Frank rationale: '
It seems ludicrous to say that a District Attorney in prosecuting a Defendant cannot use evidence obtained by a policeman
in derogation of a Defendant's constitutional rights, but can
use this same evidence obtained by a private person in derogation of a Defendant's constitutional rights which in turn is
handed over to a policeman who then hands it over to a District Attorney. . . . As this court stated previously it must
follow the law as it is and not as this court believes it should
be.
Perhaps the most confusing recent case dealing with the interrogation privilege of privately employed store detectives is United States
v. Bolden.8 2 The defendant was convicted in the United States District Court of possession of stolen credit cards. Bolden argued on appeal that he was entitled to a new trial, on the ground that he was not
given the Miranda warning by the security guards. The 8th Circuit
held: 83
... such warnings are only required when there is a "custodial
interrogation" which is defined by the Supreme Court as...
79. Id. at 268, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
80. 53 Misc. 2d 1086, 281 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Syracuse City Ct. 1967).
81. Id. at 1091, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 256. It is interesting to note that this is the very
same Sears, Roebuck branch store sued for false arrest by Henry Jacques.
82. 461 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
83. Id. at 999,
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questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. Mirandav. Arizona
384 U.S. 436.... Security Officer Cope was not a "law enforcement official" acting in a situation where the warnings
would be necessary. (emphasis added)
The conclusion that questioning by a "security officer" is not a
"custodial interrogation" because the detective is not a law enforcement official is at least a curious fiction. The merchant in the Bolden
case was in no jeopardy of losing his goods. Although the detective
knew that Bolden had no merchandise in his possession when he was
apprehended, the detective was aware that Bolden had a stolen credit
card. The primary interest the security officer had was to protect the
public by arresting Bolden for possession of a stolen credit card. The
officer knew that any statements Bolden made could and most likely
would be used against him in prosecution resulting from Bolden's
possession of the stolen credit card. Furthermore, the detention
privilege in Missouri extends only to investigation of shoplifting."4
Miranda, essentially, is a recognition that the Bill of Rights protects people by tempering the inherent effects of custodial interrogation. This spirit would demand that, when an arrest and interrogation is conducted by a member of an organization whose function
and purpose is the prevention of crime and the apprehension of
criminals, the wall between public and private interest should
crumble.8 5
VI.

CaVIL RIGHTS LIABiLITY

Primarily because the merchant detention statutes and the cases
recognizing the detention privilege have foreclosed tort liability for
any "reasonable" errors a merchant has made in the detention or the
apprehension of a suspected shoplifter, some injured parties seek
relief under the federal civil rights statutes. 8 In these cases plaintiff
is required to establish both jurisdiction8 7 and duty by alleging that
the merchant's security detectives have acted under apparent authori84. Mo. STAT. ANN. § 537.125 (Supp. 1971-1972). New York has recently enacted a privilege to detain a suspect to determine the validity of a credit card. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 516 (McKinney Supp. 1972). Missouri's anti-shoplifting statute has been interpreted as
permitting a formal arrest by a merchant pursuant to a shoplifting. op. Att'y. Gen.
No. 3 (Mo.), Grellner 11-20-70.
85. MCcoRmcK, EvmENc § 162 (2d ed. 1972).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).

87. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970).
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zation of state law, and that, as a result of their actions, the plaintiff
is denied equal protection and due process of law. The courts have
uniformly held that the merchant was acting in a private capacity,
and not vested with requisite authority of state law under the
detention statutes. 8 The effect is that any person wrongfully detained, illegally arrested, physically restrained, coerced to confess, or
forcibly searched is denied the civil rights remedy under the judicial
construction of the merchant detention statutes.
A recent example is Weyandt v. Mason's Stores, Inc.80 Plaintiff,
while a customer in defendant's establishment, was suspected of shoplifting. She was approached by the store manager and "escorted" to
a private office where she was confined, slapped and beaten, physically
restrained from leaving, and denied permission to contact her attorney.9 0 She refused to sign a confession, and was then stripped and
forcibly searched.9 1 The search proved fruitless. She was taken to a
justice of the peace and arraigned on the charges of aiding and abetting shoplifting. Subsequent charges against her were later dismissed. 92
Plaintiff alleged, in her civil rights action, that she was deprived
of her constitutional rights under "color of law."9 8 The court held
that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under the federal civil rights
act and that her appropriate redress was through tort action in the
state courts. The basis for this decision was that the defendant store
had no connection with state officers and that the defendant detectives
were not attempting to influence, obstruct, or interfere with the law. 4
There seems to be an inherent constitutional weakness in the
proposition that there are groups, whose function is the apprehension
of criminals, who have no significant legal restraints. How closely
allied to "government" must a person or group be to be considered
88. But see Weyandt v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 283, 287 (W.D. Pa. 1968)
(dicta), where the court notes that the statute merely authorizes "detention," not an

"arrest." It appears that when the detention statute authorizes an arrest and the ner.
chant is immune by statute from tort liability for reasonable errors, requisite jurisdiction for civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be found. Warren v. Cummings,

303 F. Supp. 803, 807 (W.D. Colo. 1969) (dicta); See Hill v. Toll, 320 F. Supp. 185, 187
(E.D. Pa. 1970). Thus, in jurisdictions which grant an arrest privilege, e.g., New York,
New Jersey, a Civil Rights remedy should be available. However, no such cases have
been found.
89. 279 F. Supp. 283 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
90. A California District Court of Appeal has held that a suspect in this situation

has no "right" to contact an attorney. People v. Crabtree, 239 Cal. App. 2d 789, 49
Cal. Rptr. 285 (2d D. Ct. App. 1966), hearing denied, Mar. 30, 1966 (Cal. Sup. Ct.).
91. Weyandt v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 283, 286 (W.D. Pa. 1968).

92. Id. at 285.
93. Id. at 290.
94. Id.
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sufficiently "official" to require adherence to the constitutional requirements of due process of law? The Supreme Court has held
private persons to a constitutional standard when their activities take
on governmental characteristics. 5
It is a common practice in this country for private watchmen
or guards to be vested with the powers of policemen, sheriffs,
or peace officers to protect the private property of their private
employers. And when they are performing their police functions, they are acting as public officers and assume all the
powers and liabilities attaching thereto. 6
The key to responsibility is the vesting of police power in private
individuals. Power can be vested in many ways. One is to officially
clothe the "private" police with the "color of law.' 9 7 Another is to
officially ignore the conduct of the merchant by permitting him unbridled discretion to detain and arrest. In the first instance, constitutional requirements, limitations, and liabilities attach to the power.
In the second, lack of regulation vests power by failing to restrict the
conduct of the "private" police and failing to hold them civilly
responsible for their actions.
The criteria to determine whether or not a person has acted
under the color of law are that the actor must act with the authority
of law, 18 and his conduct must make it clear that he is asserting the
authority granted him and not acting in the role of a private person. 99
For example, the New York City Administrative Code' 00 allows
any corporation doing business in the City to obtain police status for
its employees upon application. Doing business is the sole criterion.
There are no special training or qualifying requirements for the corporate personnel. Members of the corporation's security force are
simply sworn in by a City official and granted all the privileges of
policemen. Presumably, the "peace officer" has no more knowledge
of the law after he is granted police privileges than he had before,
when he was held to be a private party without sufficient knowledge
95. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).

See Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity--Protection of Personal
Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 942 (1952)
which suggests that a corporation should be held to a fourteenth amendment standard
by virtue of the fact that it is a creation of the state.
96. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin, 31 U.S. 416, 429 (1947).
97. Pratt v. State, 9 Md. App. 220, 263 A.2d 247 (1970).
98. Monroe v. Pape, 865 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).
99. Id. at 184.
100. Administrative Code of City of New York, § 434a-7.0 (1971).
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of the law to be required to safeguard a suspect's constitutional
rights. 101
Obtaining police status in this way has some major drawbacks for
the retail corporation, and the private citizen, as well. Along with the
privileges go the responsibilities. The merchant must observe the
restrictions on police conduct as set forth by the Supreme Court. 0 2
He can no longer coerce confessions, engage in unlawful searches and
seizures, or improperly interrogate a suspect without advising him
of his Miranda rights. Furthermore, the merchant corporation exposes itself and its agents to liability under the federal civil rights
statutes. 03 Very few merchants have taken advantage of these sections
of the law. 104 Fortunately for the merchants, these "privileges" are
not regulations since, in effect, they remove many of the useful
investigatory tools and expose the retail corporation to a liability
from which it is presently insulated.
How does a private citizen know if a security guard has been made
a peace officer or if he has been granted special police status by statute? Clearly, he cannot know. When a person is being interrogated
or searched by someone he believes is a private security guard, he
has no criteria against which to judge the legal obligations of the
interrogator. The suspect knows that he is believed to have committed a crime. The suspect knows that crimes carry criminal penalties. The suspect does not know that Mirandav. Arizona, 0 5 Escobedo
v. Illinois,0 6 due process of law or the Fourth, Fifth, or Fourteenth
Amendments do not protect him when he is detained by merchant
police.
CONCLUSION

By judicial decision and statute a "super-police" force has been
created. The merchant detective has the same privileges as public
law enforcement agents without the same restraints to neutralize the
effect of a violation of constitutionally protected rights. The merchant detective is treated as a private citizen for purposes of defining
his constitutional liabilities and yet he is granted tort immunity as
though he were a public law enforcement agent.
This apparent contradiction can be reconciled by either of two
I01.
102.
103.
104.

Hood v. Commonwealth, 448 S.W.2d 388, 391 (Ky. 1969).
Pratt v. State, 9 Md. App. 220, 263 A.2d 247 (1970).
Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 865 U.S. 167 (1961).
Interview, supra note 6.

105. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
106. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol1/iss1/18

16

et al.: Shoplifting Law: Constitutional Ramifications of Merchant Detenti

Comments
methods. The store detectives can be made subject to police constitutional limitations and subsequent civil rights liabilities or they can
be made liable in tort for their errors. The constitutional limitations
are the better solution to the problem.
The police activity on the part of merchants can best be characterized as an extreme self-help measure. The losses from individual
shoplifting offenses are generally very small. It is the immensity of
the aggregate loss that forces the merchant to use extreme measures
to protect his business. The merchant feels that his very existence is
threatened. Public law enforcement agencies are not equipped to
patrol and protect retail establishments on a regular basis. At best,
they can be helpful only when the act has been committed and the
perpetrator is in the custody of the merchant.
Thus, the merchant needs some extraordinary privileges in order
to protect his property; since these are police privileges, it is logical
to apply police limitations. 0 7 The overzealous detective striving to
meet his arrest quotas would be deterred if his cases were thrown
out of court because of constitutional infractions. This would be
reinforced if he were to find less in his pay envelope. In addition, the
merchant would still be able to recover stolen merchandise and retain
tort immunity for reasonable errors regardless of the outcome of a
criminal prosecution.
It is time for the courts and legislatures to recognize the need to
define the role of private merchant police. As the Supreme Court observed:
Conduct that is formally "private" may become so entwined
with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional
limitations placed upon state action.... [W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers of
functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or
instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional
limitations.1'o
107. I have discussed this problem with District Attorneys in six states ... and
found every one of them supported the belief that the Supreme Court ruling[s]
(citations omitted) [are] an interpretation of the rights of ALL citizens and
...

therefore is directed just as much at so-called "private police" as at public
law enforcement.... [A]s a consultant to the National Crime Commission I have
had opportunity to discuss this situation with men connected with the commission and they also can see no reason for assuming the Supreme Court guidelines do not apply equally to private and public law enforcement personne.
Letter from S. J. Curtis, author of MODERN RErAm SEcuRITy, to Eric T. Lodge, as cited
in Note, Regulation of Private Police, 40 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 540, 546, n.56 (1967).
108. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
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APPENDIX
RELEVANT STATUTES AND CASES

I. Anti-Shoplifting statutes and cases:
Alabama: ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 334(1) (1959).
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 11.20.277 (Supp. 1971).
Arizona: ARiz. R-Ev. STAT. ANN. § 13-675 (1972).
Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3942 (Supp. 1971).
California: Collyer v. S.H. Kress, 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936).
Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-5-31 (1963).
Connecticut: Cf. Norman v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 342
F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1965).
D.C.: Prieto v. May Dept. Stores, 216 A.2d 577 (D.C. App. 1966).
Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 647 (Supp. 1971).
Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 811.022 (Supp. 1972).
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1005 (1968).
Hawaii: HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-2 (1968).
Idaho: Sima v. Skaggs Payless Drug Center, Inc., 82 Idaho 387,
353 P.2d 1085 (1960).
Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 10-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972).
Indiana: IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3042 (Supp. 1972). (One hour limitation).
Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709.20-.24 (1972).
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3424 (Supp. 1971).
Kentucky: Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 433.234-236 (1963), as amended
(Supp. 1971).
Louisiana: LA. CODE CRIM. PRO., art. 215 (1967).
Maine: no statute, no cases on point.
Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 551A (1971). Statute dedared unconstitutional for titling defects, Clark's Brooklyn
Park, Inc. v. Hranicka, 246 Md. 178, 227 A.2d 726 (1967).
Follows common law standards. Great Atlantic and Pacific
Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 261 A.2d 731 (1970).
Massachusetts: MASS. GEI . LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 94B (Supp.
1972).
Michigan: MICH. Comn. LAws ANN. § 600.2917 (1968).
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.366 (1972).
Mississippi: Miss. CODE ANN. § 2374-04 (Supp. 1968) as amended
§ 97-23-51 (1972 effective November 1, 1973).
Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.125 (Supp. 1972).
Montana: MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-213 (1970).
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Nebraska: NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-402.01 (1965).
Nevada: NEv. REv. STAT. § 598.030 (1969).
New Hampshire: no statute, no cases on point.
New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 170-100 (1971).
New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-16-22 (1972).
New York: N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 217-18 (McKinney 1967); N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 516 (L. 1972, c. 585).
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72.1 (Supp. 1971).
North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-27 (1960).

Ohio: Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.041 (Anderson, 1972).
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1341-44 (1958), as
amended (Supp. 1972).
Oregon: ORE. REV. STAT. § 164.392 (1971).
Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4816.1 (Supp. 1972).

Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-21 (1969). Applies only to
police officers. Case law indicates that state follows old common law standards, Staples v. Schmid, 18 R.I. 224, 26 A. 193,

19 L.R.A. 824 (1893).
South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-359.4 (Supp. 1971).
South Dakota: S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 22-37-24 (1967).
Tennessee:

TENN. CODE ANN. §

40-824 (1971).

Texas: TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1436e (Supp. 1972).
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-30 (Supp. 1971).
Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2566 (Supp. 1972). Statute

states that merchant may request patrons to keep merchandise
in full view. No case law on point.
Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-127 (1960). But see Zayre of
Virginia, Inc. v. Gowdy, 207 Va. 47, 147 S.E.2d 710 (1966).
Washington: WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.220 (Supp. 1971).
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3A-4 (Supp. 1972).
Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.50 (Supp. 1972).
Wyoming: Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-146.1-.3 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
II. State laws permitting the appointment of special patrolmen.
(Note: this list does not include municipal ordinances which
provide for similar appointments.)
Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-109-111 (1964).
Connecticut: CONN. GEN'q. STAT. REv. § 29-19 (1962).
D.C.: D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-115 (1967).
Indiana: IND. ANN. STAT. § 41-6108 (Supp. 1972).
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 13-2006 (1964).
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Louisiana: LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1433 (Supp. 1972).
Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 60-70 (1971).

Michigan: MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 338.1051-.1081 (Supp. 1972).
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 418.12 (1958).
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-219 (1970).
New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A: 14-146 (1972).
North Carolina: N.C. GFN. STAT. § 74A-1,2 (Supp. 1971).
Ohio: Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 109.78 (Page, 1971).
Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 3704 (1957).
South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 53-3 (Supp. 1971).
Texas: TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 995 (1963).
Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-143.1 to 153 (1964), as amended
(Cum. Supp. 1971).
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